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Abstract In the Michotte task, a ball (X) moves toward a
resting ball (Y). In the moment of contact, X stops und Y starts
moving. Previous studies have shown that subjects tend to
view X as the causal agent (BX launches Y^) rather than Y
(BY stops X^). Moreover, X tends to be attributed more force
than Y (force asymmetry), which contradicts the laws of
Newtonian mechanics. Recent theories of force asymmetry
try to explain these findings as the result of an asymmetrical
identification with either the (stronger) agent or the (weaker)
patient of the causal interaction. We directly tested this as-
sumption by manipulating attributions of causal agency while
holding the properties of the causal interaction constant across
conditions. In contrast to previous accounts, we found that
force judgments stayed invariant across conditions in which
assignments of causal agency shifted from X to Y and that
even those subjects who chose Y as the causal agent gave
invariantly higher force ratings to X. These results suggest
that causal agency and the perception of force are conceptually
independent of each other. Different possible explanations are
discussed.
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In Michotte’s (1963) seminal demonstrations of phenomenal
causality, subjects observed moving objects that seemingly
interacted with one other. For example, in a launching sce-
nario, a ball (X) moves toward a resting ball (Y) and touches
it. At this moment, X stops and Y starts moving with the same
velocity and direction as X before (see Fig. 1, upper set of
pictures, for an illustration). Observers typically describe this
scenario as a case in which X launched Y (White, 2006) indi-
cating that X is perceived as the causal agent and Y as the
causal patient.Moreover, subjects tend to assume that X exerts
more force on Y than vice versa (White, 2009).
However, this asymmetrical ascription is at odds with
physical laws. According to Newtonian mechanics, the phys-
ical interaction between two objects X and Y is perfectly sym-
metric, and the force that X exerts on Y in the moment of
collision is equal in magnitude to the counterforce that Y
exerts on X. Thus, in purely Newtonian terms, the description
that Y stops X is equally consistent with the observation as the
description that X launches Y (White, 2006). Moreover, the
estimated forces for X and Y should be equal. But what, then,
puts us up to such an asymmetric ascription of forces that
seemingly violates the underlying symmetry of the physical
interaction?
Causal agency in physical interactions
Although physical interactions themselves are symmetric, a
general distinction between a more active object involved in
the cause event (i.e., X’s collision with Y) and a more passive
object involved in the relevant effect event (i.e., Y being
launched) is shared by all theories that address the perception
of causal interactions. We are going to use the terms causal
agent and causal patient to distinguish between these different
causal roles, but others have suggested a slightly different
terminology, for example, cause object and effect object
(White, 2006, 2009, 2012a), situational agent and situational
patient (e.g., Muentener & Carey, 2010), agentive role and
receptive role (e.g., Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, 2007), antagonist
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and agonist (Talmy, 1988), or affector and patient (e.g.,Wolff,
2007). Causal agents generally refer to objects (including
humans) that act on causal patients (see Saxe et al., 2007,
for a discussion). Moreover, the assignment of the causal
agent and causal patient roles is temporary, restricted to a
particular causal interaction; the same object can play the roles
of both a causal agent and a causal patient in different inter-
actions. As we will see below, theories of force asymmetry
heavily rely on this asymmetrical construal of physical inter-
actions in terms of causal agency.
Typically, the assignment of causal agency in physical inter-
actions is assessed via the linguistic descriptions that subjects
choose for describing the scenarios (see, e.g., Mayrhofer &
Waldmann, 2014; White, 2006, 2012b). For instance, a fre-
quent description of the Michotte scenario is that BBall X
launched Ball Y,^ which assigns X the role of the causal agent
(see Dowty, 1991; Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2015, for discus-
sions of the role of language in assignments of causal agency).
If a subject instead chooses the description that BBall Y stopped
Ball X,^ this choice would be interpreted as indicating the
perception of Yas the more active part in the causal interaction
(i.e., that Yacts onX). In our experiments, we have adopted this
linguistic measure as an empirical indicator of how subjects
assign the roles of causal agents and patients in a particular
observed scenario (see also Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2014).
Theories of force asymmetry
One of the most prominent theories of causal perception in the
Michotte task has been developed by White, who distin-
guishes between a cause object and an effect object (White,
2006, 2009, 2012a). According to White’s theory, perceived
scenes, such as a Michottean launching display, are compared
to stored representations of sensomotoric experiences of our
actions on objects. During our ontogenetic development, we
interact causally with the world by actively and often success-
fully manipulating objects (e.g., pushing, kicking, squeezing,
pulling). We experience our own agency and the force we
impose upon the objects. These experiences are stored togeth-
er with an abstract representation of the actions. When pas-
sively perceiving a scene, we compare the movements of the
objects with these stored representations. The object whose
behavior is most similar to our own actions tends to be viewed
as the cause object or causal agent (e.g., the pusher).
According to White’s theory, we typically overestimate the
force of the cause object relative to the counterforce of the
manipulated effect object (i.e., the patient; e.g., the pushed
ball) because the (counter-)force exerted by the effect object
is perceptually attenuated (White, 2009). Thus, force asym-
metry is explained as the result of both (1) an identification of
the observer with the causal agent in the interaction via a
match to a stored representation of an action that is perceptu-
ally similar to the perceived scene and (2) an agent-centered
representation of forces in this matched action (i.e., the actor
expending more force).
A competing account of how causal interactions are repre-
sented has been put forward by Wolff and Shepard (2013; see
also Wolff, Ritter, & Holmes, 2014). Whereas White’s (2006,
2009, 2012a) theory is based on the assumption that observers
identify themselves with the causal agent, Wolff and Shepard
(2013) suggest that it is exactly the other way around:
Perceivers Bempathize with the object that suffers the effect,
that is, the patient^ (p. 188). To support their theory,Wolff and
Shepard (2013) reported a series of experiments in which
subjects observed both causal and noncausal interactions. In
the most basic setup, subjects watched aMichottean launching
event or, as a noncausal control, a single ball passing from left
to right across the screen. Subjects were instructed to imme-
diately press a button after having observed the scenes under
the following three conditions: (a) when they heard a sound,
(b) when they saw a visual signal, or (c) when they felt a small
force applied by means of a haptic controller (as a measure of
touch sensitivity). Interestingly, touch sensitivity increased af-
ter having observed a causal interaction compared to the non-
causal control conditions. By contrast, the type of scene (i.e.,
causal vs. noncausal) did not influence reaction times to the
visual or acoustic stimuli. This dissociation indicates that the
perception of causal interactions selectively primes the sensa-
tion of touch but does not generally prime motor responses to
any kind of stimulus. According to Wolff and Shepard, this is
evidence against White’s (2009, 2012a) account: If the match
to a stored representation of our own action puts subjects in
the role of the causal agent in the scene, one would expect a





Fig. 1 An illustration of the movement patterns of Ball X (gray) and Ball
Y (black) depending on movement condition (upper vs. lower set of
pictures); see text for details. Note. Adapted from BIndicators of Causal
Agency in Physical Interactions: The Role of the Prior Context,^ by R.
Mayrhofer and M. R. Waldmann, 2014, Cognition, 132, pp. 485–490
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facilitated motor response to any kind of stimulus when per-
ceiving a causal interaction. Instead, according to Wolff and
Shepard, subjects identify with the object playing the role of
the patient.
Wolff and Shepard (2013) have not addressed force asym-
metry directly in their research. However, since their view
represents a contrast to White’s, it is interesting to consider
its implications for the issue of force asymmetry. Within the
framework of Wolff and Shepard, force asymmetry could be
predicted if the assumption is made that the resisting force of
the patient with which observers tend to identify is experi-
enced as weaker than the force of the agent. This additional
assumption is consistent withWolff and Shepard’s account, as
they say that the patient suffers the effect, which implies that
its initial state or tendency has been overpowered by the agent.
Testing the relation between causal agency and force
Although both accounts attribute the reason for the perception
of force in causal interactions differently as either resulting
from an identification with the (stronger) causal agent
(White, 2012a) or with its (weaker) patient (Wolff &
Shepard, 2013), they both imply that force asymmetry arises
from the asymmetric assignment of causal roles in a particular
causal interaction. Thus, because Ball X is typically assigned
the role of the causal agent and Ball Y the role of the causal
patient in Michottean launching scenarios, X is attributed
more force than Y. Unfortunately, the evidence for a relation-
ship between causal agency and force attribution that has been
presented so far is confounded, because factors affecting force
attributions have not been independently manipulated from fac-
tors that affect intuitions about causal agency. In typical exper-
iments, the physical features of the causal interaction varied
across conditions (e.g., the pre- and postcollision velocities;
see Hubbard & Ruppel, 2013; White, 2006, 2007, 2009).
Since features of the physical interaction at the point of contact
of the two balls, such as the pre- and postcontact velocities, may
plausibly influence both causal agency and force assignments,
the obtained correlation between causal agency and force attri-
butions might be spurious rather than causal.
In order to rigorously test whether assignments of causal
agency influence force judgments, it is necessary to manipulate
causal agency through features that are independent of the caus-
al interaction itself. We therefore presented variants of the
Michotte scenario in which the degree to which the two balls
are viewed as causal agents is varied, while the properties of the
causal interaction at the point of contact are held constant.
According to theories that suggest that force asymmetries are
caused by the asymmetric assignment of causal agency, this
manipulation should also manifest itself in force attributions.
Hence, the more an object is viewed as the causal agent, the
stronger its judged relative force should be. To manipulate
causal agency independent of the physical interaction, we used
a paradigm developed byMayrhofer andWaldmann (2014; see
also Zhou et al., 2012, for a technique of manipulating causal
agency through social instead of movement cues).
Mayrhofer andWaldmann (2014) employed variants of the
standard launching scenario in which assignments of causal
agency shifted from Ball X to Ball Y by manipulating the
movement pattern of Y prior to the causal interaction. For
instance, in a scenario in which Y was placed below the tra-
jectory of X, then suddenly moved upwards and stopped on
X’s path prior to the collision (causing the impression that Y
might have intentionally moved into X’s trajectory; interven-
tion condition), more people were willing to describe the
scene as BY stopped X^ instead of BX launched Y^ than in
the standard launching scenario.
Because the properties of the causal interaction itself (i.e.,
the collision) and everything that happened afterwards were
held constant across the conditions, these scenarios can be
used to test the potential interaction between intuitions about
causal agency and force: If the perception of force was a func-
tion of causal-agency assignment, force ratings for X and Y
should be altered when causal agency is manipulated, even if
the collision properties do not vary.
Experiment 1
In the experiment, we used two variants of the Michottean
launching setup, as developed in Mayrhofer and Waldmann
(2014). In the standard Michottean launching scenario (see
Fig. 1, upper set of pictures) that was also used by White
(2006, 2009) and by Wolff and Shepard (2013) Ball X tends
to be assigned the role of the causal agent (or cause object) and
Ball Y the role of the causal patient (or effect object), as people
strongly prefer to describe the scene as BX launched Y^ com-
pared to BY stopped X.^ Moreover, X is typically ascribed
more force than Y (White, 2009).
In the contrasting intervention condition, a sudden move-
ment of Y into X’s trajectory that appears like a self-propelled
action shifts the assignment of causal agency from Ball X
toward Ball Y. According to theories that claim that force
ratings track assignments of causal agency, a similar shift of
the force ratings for X and Y should be seen.
Method
Participants and design
Nine hundred thirty-four native speakers of English (58 %
female, age range 16–85 years, mean age 48.2 years) were
recruited via an online database in the U.K.1 and compensated
1 http://www.maximiles.co.uk
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with a voucher worth £0.50. The experiment was run as a 2
(movement pattern: standard Michotte vs. intervention)×2
(question type: causal-agency vs. force assessment)
between-subjects design. Each subject made assessments
about both balls (X, Y). Between 233 and 234 subjects were
randomly assigned to each condition. We excluded 216 addi-
tional subjects (57% female, age range 17–84 years, mean age
47.6 years) from further analyses because they reported a fail-
ure when watching the movie clip or because they failed to
pass a simple logical transitivity task that was presented at the
end of the experiment (see Procedure section), yielding an
overall exclusion rate of 18.8 %.2
Material
The scenarios were implemented as flash movies that were
720×720 pixels in size and played effectively 2,200 ms (pre-
ceded and followed by additional 400 ms of black screen).
Each movie showed the interaction of two balls, Ball X and
Ball Y (one in red and one in blue, each 120 pixels in diam-
eter; see Fig. 1 for an illustration). In Condition 1 (standard
launching), the standard Michottean setup, Y is at rest in the
middle of the screen. Then X enters the scene from the left
side on a horizontal trajectory with constant speed until it
reaches the center of the screen after 1,100 ms. At the moment
of contact, X stops moving and Y starts moving with the same
speed as X toward the right hand side of the screen, eventually
leaving the scene. In Condition 2 (intervention), the position
and movement of Y in the first 800 ms was altered: Y was
initially at rest in the lower half of the screen (200 pixels above
the bottom margin) and started moving upward after 500 ms.
Y stopped after 300 ms of movement in the middle of the
screen (at exactly the same place as it was placed in
Condition 1 at the beginning of the scene) such that Y is at
rest 300 ms prior the collision. This manipulation creates an
impression of self-propelled movement toward the position in
the middle of the screen, and thus the impression of a voli-
tional act aiming to stop X (see Mayrhofer & Waldmann,
2013, 2014, for a detailed discussion). Note that the move-
ment pattern of X was identical in both conditions; the move-
ment pattern for Y was also identical, except for the first
800 ms.
For counterbalancing purposes, we additionally generated
an additional movie per movement condition in which we
switched the colors of the balls.
Apparatus
We had no control over the precise display conditions because
the study was run online. However, we ensured that the pre-
sented movie fits on the screen under usual display resolu-
tions. At the end of the experiment, 3.74 % of the subjects
reported problems when asked whether the movie was played
correctly (evenly distributed across conditions); these subjects
were excluded from further analyses.
Procedure
Subjects were first presented with a brief instruction stating
the purpose of the experiment and explaining that they would
see a short movie followed by a few questions. After the
movie presentation, we asked subjects to make assessments
about causal agency or force, respectively (i.e., between sub-
jects). In the agency-assessment condition, we requested sub-
jects to rate how well each of two following sentences de-
scribes the scene using two separate rating scales ranging from
0 (not appropriate at all) to 10 (highly appropriate):3
1. The red ball launched the blue ball.
2. The blue ball stopped the red ball.
In the force-assessment condition, we asked subjects to
indicate how much force both balls exerted on each other
using two separate rating scales, ranging from 0 (no force at
all) to 10 (maximum possible force):4
1. How much force did the blue ball exert on the red ball at
the time of collision?
2. How much force did the red ball exert on the blue ball at
the time of collision?
Both the two sentences and the rating scales were presented
on a single screen; the order of test questions was
counterbalanced.
At the end, participants were presented with a simple log-
ical transitivity question—BImagine four balls: Black, Orange,
Yellow, and Green. If Black is bigger than Orange, and Yellow
is bigger than Black, and Green is bigger than Yellow, which
of the four balls is the smallest?^—along with the four possi-
ble answer options presented in randomized order. We used
this simple test to exclude subjects who might not have paid
sufficient attention to the task.5
2 In our experience, the quality of data (e.g., proportion of random
guessers or subjects that did not read the instructions carefully) depends
on what experiment platform the experiment is hosted. Typically, exclu-
sion rates are lower in experiments run in the M-Turk community (see,
e.g., Mason & Suri, 2012), which is not accessible to researchers outside
the U.S.
3 The presented sentences were matched to the respective color version.
4 These were the same rating scales as used by White (2007, 2009).
5 An analysis that included the subjects who failed at this test yielded
qualitatively the same results (i.e., patterns of statistically significant ef-
fects) as those reported below.
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Results
Control factors
Neither color version of the clip nor the order of the rating
scales affected judgments. None of the main effects nor the
interaction proved significant (all ps > .16). We therefore ag-
gregated over these factors in the following analyses.
Assessment of causal agency
Figure 2a shows the mean ratings of causal agency for both
Ball X and Ball Y, depending on condition (standard
launching vs. intervention). The ratings for X were generally
higher than the ratings for Y, F(1, 465) = 127.4, p < .001, η2 =
.22. As expected, the ratings for X decreased from 8.24 to 6.76
from the standard Michotte condition to the contrasted inter-
vention condition, t(465) = 5.5, p < .001. The ratings for Y
increased accordingly—but to a substantially smaller extent—
from 4.61 to 5.21, t(465) = 1.7, p < .05. This pattern yielded
the predicted interaction between condition and rated ball,
F(1, 465) = 20.6, p < .001, η2 = .04. The obtained pattern
replicates the findings of Mayrhofer and Waldmann (2014)
in a between-subjects design and an online paradigm. The
results again demonstrate that the manipulation of the move-
ment pattern of Yprior to the causal interaction altered agency
attributions.
Force assessment
In Fig. 2b, the mean force ratings for Ball X and Ball Y are
presented for both conditions (standard launching vs. inter-
vention). The force ratings for X were generally higher than
those for Y, F(1, 465) = 114.1, p < .001, η2 = .20. In contrast to
the agency ratings, the force ratings did not depend on the
movement pattern, F(1, 465) = 1.9, p = .17. In contrast to
the predictions derived from extant theories of force asymme-
try, there is no interaction between movement pattern and ball,
F(1, 465) <1, p = .95 (the difference between force ratings is
essentially the same for both conditions). This finding shows
that force intuitions are not affected by attributions of causal
agency (at least if one assumes a linear mapping between
causal agency and force ratings).
Overall analysis
The separate analyses for causal-agency assignment and the
attribution of force revealed that intuitions about causal agen-
cy but not force ratings were influenced by the movement
patterns of Ball Y prior to the interaction. This dissociation
is statistically supported by a three-way interaction between
movement pattern, ball, and question type (causal agency vs.
force), F(1, 930) = 13.0, p < .001, η2 = .01.
Discussion
Theories of causal perception suggest that there should be a
strong coupling between assignment of causal agency and
attributions of force to the involved objects (White, 2012a;
Wolff & Shepard, 2013). In contrast to these predictions, we
found that force ratings stayed invariant across conditions in
which assignments of causal agency, as measured by the stan-
dard linguistic measure used in previous research, varied with
the movement pattern of Ball Y prior to the collision, but the
properties of the interaction itself were held constant. One
may object, however, that in both movement-pattern condi-
tions more causal agency was attributed to Ball X, and force
asymmetry may only track relative assignments. In such a
case, one might not expect a shift in force ratings.
Experiment 2
In this experiment, we assessed causal agency with a forced-
choice measure (i.e., whether either X or Y is the agent; see
also Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2014, Experiment 1) and let
participants judge the interacting forces subsequently (i.e.,
within subject). According to theories of force asymmetry,
subjects who chose X as the agent should attribute more force
to X and, more importantly, subjects who chose Yas the agent
should attribute more force to Y.
Method
Participants and design
Three hundred thirty-six native speakers of English (56 %
female, age range 20–87 years, mean age 50.8 years) were
recruited as in Experiment 1; 231 additional subjects (64 %
female; age range 17 to 83 years; mean 48.5 years) were
excluded from further analyses for indicating a movie failure
(24 %), for failing to pass the same logical transitivity task as
in Experiment 1 (49%), or for failing to correctly report which
Ball eventually left the scene6 (55 %), yielding an overall
exclusion rate of 40.7 %.7 The experiment was run as a 2
(movement pattern: standard Michotte vs. intervention)×2
6 We added this question because it is central that subjects do not confuse
the two balls when selecting the causal agent and rating the forces.
7 Without the additional question about the ball leaving the scene the
exclusion rate would have been 37.2 %. We suspect that the reason for
the increase (compared to Experiment 1) is the increased length of the
experiment such that a higher proportion of subjects lost interest. (Note:
Subjects were paid independent of answers, and in contrast to MTurk,
there were no negative long-term consequences for random responding.
Moreover, MTurk subjects seem to have more experience as subjects of
psychological experiments.) As with Experiment 1, we obtained qualita-
tively the same patterns of results when we included the excluded subjects
in our analyses.
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(question type: force vs. causal-agency assessment) design.
The factor movement pattern was manipulated between sub-
jects, the factor question type within subject. Each subject
made agency and force assessments about both balls (X, Y).
Material and procedure
We used the same movies and instructions as in Experiment 1.8
First, we requested subjects who had watched the movie to
choose one of the following sentences as the best description of
the scene (i.e., forced choice, counterbalanced order, color-
matched; see alsoMayrhofer&Waldmann, 2014, Experiment 1):
1. The red ball launched the blue ball.
2. The blue ball stopped the red ball.
Subsequently, we assessed force intuitions as in
Experiment 1 but with two separate sliders ranging from 0
to 100 (instead of two separate rating scales) on an additional
screen (in counterbalanced order).
Results
Causal agency and force assessments
The willingness to choose Ball Y as the agent increased from
10.1 % in the standard condition to 29.8 % in the intervention
condition (see Fig. 3a), χ21 = 20.3, p < .001.
9 Hence, the
manipulation of the movement properties of Y prior to the
causal interaction effectively alters assignments of causal
agency.
The force ratings are shown in Fig. 3b. As in Experiment 1,
force ratings for Ball X were generally higher than those for
Ball Y, F(1, 334) = 137.7, p < .001, η2 = .29. The movement-
pattern of Y, however, did not affect force ratings; neither the
main effect, F(1, 334) < 1, p = .33, nor the interaction with the
rated ball, F(1, 334) < 1, p = .54, proved significant.
Force assessments conditioned upon assignment of causal
agency
As expected, participants who chose Ball X as the causal agent
attributed more force to X (57.8) than to Y (33.5), t(268) =
12.1, p < .001, demp = 0.74 (across movement-pattern condi-
tions). However, participants who chose Ball Y as the causal
agent also attributed more force to X (56.1) than to Y (43.8),
t(66) = 2.7, p < .01, demp = 0.33 (across movement-pattern
conditions). This finding is at odds with the assumption that
force perception is causally influenced by the assignment of
causal agency with more force being attributed to the agentive
object of the interaction.
Discussion
In line with the findings of Experiment 1, we found that
a sudden movement of Ball Y into the trajectory of Ball
X increased subjects’ willingness to choose Y as the
causal agent of the interaction. Force ratings, however,
were unaffected by this manipulation—although partici-
pants were requested to explicitly assign causal agency
prior to the judgments of forces. Additionally, even sub-
jects who chose Y as the causal agent attributed more
force to X than to Y which is inconsistent with the
hypothesis that asymmetries of force attributions are a

















































Fig. 2 Ratings of causal agency (a) and force ratings (b) for Ball X and Ball Yper movement condition (standard launching vs. intervention). Error bars
indicate 95 % confidence intervals
8 In Experiment 2, the assignment of colors to the balls was not
counterbalanced but randomized across subjects.
9 The preference for selecting Y as the causal agent in the intervention
condition is smaller than in the corresponding experiment of Mayrhofer
and Waldmann (2014). This might be due to the within-subject design
used in the previous study, which may have made the difference between
conditions more salient for participants.
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General discussion
In the standardMichottean launching setup, Ball X is typically
viewed as the causal agent or cause object (White, 2006) and
is attributed more force than Ball Y (White, 2009). Extant
theories of causal perception suggest that the asymmetrical
assignment of causal agency to the involved objects is the
reason for the asymmetrical attribution of force (White,
2009, 2012a; Wolff & Shepard, 2013). In the present studies,
we aimed to directly test this central assumption by manipu-
lating intuitions about causal agency independent of the phys-
ical interaction at contact. In contrast to the predictions of the
otherwise competing accounts, we found that force attribu-
tions were invariant across conditions in which assignment
of causal agency was experimentally manipulated. Our find-
ings show that the perception of forces is conceptually inde-
pendent of intuitions about causal agency.
Our finding leaves us with the open question how force
asymmetry could possibly be explained without an appeal to
causal agency. Force asymmetry is at odds with theories that
model intuitive physics as a case of Newtonian mechanics
(e.g., Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado, & Tenenbaum,
2012; Sanborn, Mansinghka, & Griffiths, 2013; Ullman,
Stuhlmüller, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2014), according to
which the forces should be symmetric.
An interesting possibility to reconcile the finding that caus-
al agency is independent of force was raised by a reviewer.
Theories connecting force attributions to intuitions about
causal agency could be rescued by assuming that there are
two causal agents in the scenario: the causal agent prior to
the causal interaction that our manipulation influenced and
the causal agent at the very moment of contact between ob-
jects X and Y. Since we ourselves are sympathetic with dis-
positional theories (see Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2015), we
agree that this is an interesting possibility. However, this claim
is basically derived post hoc from the observed force ratings.
Therefore, it remains circular until independent evidence of
agency attributions at the point of contact is presented. Also it
should be noted that we have used the standard procedure
(verbal statements) that had been used previously (e.g.,
White, 2006, 2012b), and that the statements (e.g., BThe blue
ball stopped the red ball^) do not only refer to the precollision
phase but to the whole event (the blue ball could not possibly
be seen as stopping the red ball prior to the collision). We
would be eager to see empirical evidence for the claim that
agency assignments may shift online during the event.
However, in the previous literature this possibility has not
been empirically demonstrated.
Causal process theories (e.g., Dowe, 2000; Salmon, 1984)
may be an alternative candidate for explaining force asymme-
try. Process theories, which seem particularly suitable for
modeling physical processes as presented in Michottean sce-
narios, describe the world in terms of intersecting world lines
that embody causal processes. According to Dowe (2000),
processes carry a quantity, such as linear momentum, mass-
energy, or charge, which is conserved within the process. Of
course, only experts know these physical quantities whereas
most subjects do not have deep knowledge about physics (see
Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). However, despite the lack of elabo-
rate physical domain knowledge it seems plausible to assume
that even laypeople represent the Michotte task as a causal
process in which some sort of hidden property, a placeholder
for the underlying quantity, is transmitted when X moves to-
ward Y and makes contact. A psychologically plausible can-
didate for such a property might be the (pre-Newtonian) con-
cept of impetus, which is usually represented as an internal
force that keeps an object moving and which can be assumed
to be transferred from one object to another in a collision event
Fig. 3 Relative frequency of causal-agency assignments (a) and force ratings (b) for Ball X and Ball Yper movement condition (standard launching vs.
intervention). Error bars indicate 95 % confidence intervals
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(see, e.g., Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001; McCloskey, 1983).
If force intuitions traced the transference of such impetus (i.e.,
internal force), one would expect an asymmetrical assignment
of forces that expresses the directionality of the causal inter-
action. However, in such a case one would also expect low or
zero attribution of force to Y, which is at odds with our finding
of relatively high ratings for Y. Actually in line with the pre-
diction of process theories, White (2007, 2009) found near-
zero ratings of force attributions to Y with very similar mate-
rial. We suspect that our higher ratings for Y were caused by a
small subset of subjects who activated knowledge from school
about Newtonian mechanics and therefore gave equal ratings
to X and Y.
In sum, there are several theoretical directions that could be
developed to explain agency and force intuitions in the
Michotte task. Our experiments provide important new con-
straints for these theories but further research is needed to
determine which of them best captures the phenomena.
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